SpoofCheck

Email Security Analysis of pierre-fabre.com

Complete verification of pierre-fabre.com's SPF, DKIM, DMARC, and MTA-STS records. Find out if this domain is protected against email spoofing.

Last updated: April 15, 2026

73B
This domain is vulnerable to spoofing

SPF

OK
v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com ip4:217.182.52.193 ip4:193.70.96.19 ip4:212.2.32.150 ip4:212.2.32.128 ip4:213.190.76.3/32 ip4:167.89.26.120/32 ip4:91.238.150.104 ip4:91.195.207.253 ip4:213.199.154.23 ip4:80.94.183.28/31 ip4:195.144.18.204 include:spf.webcrm.com ip4:62.109.128.67 ip4:46.105.79.115 ip4:37.187.24.213 ip4:188.165.41.33 ip4:195.188.87.55 ip4:194.187.224.14 ip4:94.186.148.156 include:sendgrid.net ip4:5.249.132.140 ip4:5.249.132.141 ip4:5.249.132.142 ip4:77.81.239.206 ip4:77.81.239.207 ip4:94.186.148.172 ip4:80.12.14.1 ip4:217.13.56.5 ip4:185.7.39.7 ip4:185.7.39.6 ip4:46.105.39.121 ip4:178.33.237.19 ip4:184.72.194.240 ip4:195.82.66.140 ip4:85.13.156.251 ip4:54.246.89.35 ip4:194.187.224.13 ip4:185.93.39.69 ip4:217.125.89.218 ip4:185.21.152.19 ip4:185.21.152.22 ip4:81.201.112.21 ip4:81.201.112.22 ip4:61.8.194.11 include:spf.mandrillapp.com include:_spfeu.qmarkets-dns.org ip4:61.8.194.114 ip4:193.201.39.111 ip4:91.238.151.76 ip4:188.93.22.222 ip4:84.39.36.4 ip4:176.111.246.128 ip4:91.238.151.100/31 ip4:91.238.151.92 ip4:54.229.96.1 ip4:54.229.96.23 ip4:54.229.96.27 ip4:54.229.96.36 ip4:54.229.96.53 ip4:54.229.96.66 ip4:83.219.80.5 ip4:212.36.72.16/28 ip4:217.13.56.7 include:_spf.salesforce.com ip4:91.238.151.104 ip4:185.154.21.21 -all

DKIM

OK
Selectors: selector1, selector2, mandrill

DMARC

Warning
v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:rua@pierre-fabre.com,mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email; ruf=mailto:ruf@pierre-fabre.com; adkim=r; aspf=r;
Read the guide

MX

OK
pierrefabre-com01e.mail.protection.outlook.com

MTA-STS

Missing

No record found

Read the guide

Recommendations

  1. 1Change your DMARC policy from p=none to p=reject to block spoofing

    With p=none, your DMARC record only monitors — it doesn't actually block spoofed emails. Attackers can still send emails as your domain and they'll be delivered normally. Switching to p=reject instructs receiving servers to drop fraudulent messages before they reach the inbox.

  2. 2Add MTA-STS to enforce TLS encryption for incoming emails

    Without MTA-STS, an attacker performing a man-in-the-middle attack can downgrade the connection between mail servers to plaintext, intercepting emails in transit. MTA-STS tells sending servers to only deliver via TLS with a valid certificate, preventing downgrade attacks.

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Run a live analysis

The results above are updated daily. For an instant check of pierre-fabre.com, run a live analysis.

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Guides to understand these results

SPF Guide

Understand how SPF defines which servers are authorized to send emails for a domain.

DKIM Guide

Discover how DKIM cryptographically signs your emails to guarantee their authenticity.

DMARC Guide

Learn how DMARC orchestrates SPF and DKIM to protect your domain.

MTA-STS Guide

Learn how MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption to protect your emails in transit.

SPF vs DKIM vs DMARC

Compare the three protocols and understand how they work together.